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Of the many problems that arise in the determination of the taxable transaction
in consumers' taxes, this paper is devoted mainly to those which have reached the
courts.' Two consumers' taxes in particular are stressed; the sales tax, and its variant,
the retailers' occupation tax. The matters discussed herein will, however, find an
appreciable application in most other consumers' taxes.
A typical sales tax provision provides that "a tax is hereby levied on each retail
sale of tangible personal property."2 Under such a provision, three main problems
arise in the determination of the taxable transaction: First, what is a "sale"? Second,
what is a "retail sale"? Third, what is "tangible personal property"? The first and
third of these problems are discussed in this paper. The second problem, to which
these are antecedent, is discussed in the next succeeding article.8
The common law has, of course, a long tradition in the definition of each of these
terms. Definitions of the word "sale" are found especially in cases under the Statute
of Frauds, and under the Uniform Sales Act. The tax cases have, it is true, uniformly
declared that it is to the definition contained in the taxing statute, rather than to the
common-law tradition, that one must first turn to determine whether a given activity
is taxable. But what courts say and how they react are two different things. The
ensuing discussion will reveal that the common law is still valuable as a key to
judicial interpretation of the statutory definition.
THE MEANING OF SALE

Sale v. Service

In the law of sales a distinction is drawn between the sale of goods and the
furnishing of services. 4 This distinction lies at the basis of many of the sales tax
cases. While some few statutes specifically include certain limited types of services,r
* A.B., 1939, J.D., 1941, University of Chicago.
1
For other discussions see Philipsborn, Illinois Supreme Court and the Retailers' Occupatlion Tax
(I937) 31 ILL. L. REv. 741, (1938) 32 id. 685; Note, Applicability of the Sales Tax to Particular
Transactions (1938) 23 WASH. U. L. Q. 399; Jacoby, Conflicting Interpretationsof Retail Sales Tax Laws
(1934) 2 U. op Cm. L. REv. 78; HAIG AND SHOup, THE SALES TA X IN THE A~mnucAN STATES (934);
(1938) 51 HAv. L. REV. 753, II So. CALIF. L. REv. 532.
'Omo CoDv ANN. (Throckmorton, 1940) §5546-2.
3
See Wahrbafig, Meaning of Retail Sale and Storage, Use or Other Consumption, infra this issue.
Ai WsLS-roN, SALEs (2d ed. 1924) 54, 55.

'See W. VA. CODE ANm. (Michie and Sublett, 1937) §§999(3), 999(8), 999(2) (applies to "all
services except professional and personal services"); Omo CoDE ANN. (Throckmorton, 1940) §5546-2

TAXABLE TRANSACTION: JUDICIAL DECISIONS

53T

the majority either make a specific exclusion, or exclude by reason of their statutory
or common-law definition of a "sale." Services which are entirely divorced from any
transfer of ownership of property are, therefore, clearly not subject to the tax. The
difficult problem arises in the case of those services which as an incident thereto also
involve a transfer of property. The wording of the statutes is certainly broad enough
to include such transfers, but both tax commissions and courts have adopted a more
restricted interpretation. 6 Surely no one would contend that, when a barber shaves a
person, the application of shaving soap and lotion should be taxed as a sale. Nor,
on the other hand, is it contended that a deduction should be made from the sale
price of gasoline purchased because of the window-wiping service of the attendant.
But these are cases where the sale or the service element is merely incidental. Other
cases lie in between. They are probably best approached by an analysis of specific
fact situations in which the problem has arisen.
In the professions and allied groups, the doctor, the dentist, the lawyer, or the
optometrist is clearly not within the statute, if no tangible property is transferred.
But when the doctor puts a metal brace on a broken leg, the dentist prepares a set
of false teeth, the lawyer draws an abstract of title, or the optometrist delivers a pair
of glasses, one is faced with a more difficult situation. The problem is neatly presented by the dispute over the taxability of the optometrist. Illinois has held that
the optometrist is not liable for any tax, as the sale of glasses, even though a factor
in determining the total price, is merely incidental and necessary to the furtherance
of the professional service rendered7 The court stressed the professional requirements
of education and training,8 and the fact that a reputation is established not because
of the quality of the merchandise furnished, but rather as a result of the ability shown
in the service rendered. The optometrist was compared to the physician who incidentally furnishes medicines, braces or surgical dressings, or the dentist with whom
the by-product of skill is inlays and dentures. 9
The majority of jurisdictions,' 0 however, have held the optometrist taxable at least
for the sale price of the glasses, though they concede that there is no tax on the professional service. It is pointed out that classification of optometry as a profession
under state optometry laws does not preclude the possibility that the optometrist
(exempts "professional, insurance, or personal service transactions which involve sales as inconsequential
elements"). Because of the limited nature of the services included, these could hardly be called gross
receipts taxes.
0 Such an interpretation may run counter to uniformity clauses of some state constitutions, which, as
in Winter v. Barrett, 352 Ill. 441, i86 N. E. 113 ('933), have been held to require that all persons
engaged in the business of selling tangible personal property must be included in the tax.
'Babcock v. Nudelman, 367 Il1.626, x2 N. E. (2d) 635 (1937).
These requirements are remarkably similar to those of a master plumber; see, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT.
(Bar Ass'n Ed., 1939) c. 111!/, §§95 et seq. Is the plumber, therefore, also exempt from taxation?
0 See Berry-Kofran Dental Laboratory Co. v. Smith, 345 Mo. 922, r37 S. W. (2d) 452 (1940);
Axelrod-Beacon Dental Laboratory v. City of Philadelphia, 34 D. & C. sgo (Pa. Com. Pl. 1938). Compare the common law which has held that a contract for the sale of false teeth by a dentist is a contract
to sell within the Statute of Frauds. Lee v. Griffen, i B. & S. 272 (Ex. 186i).
"°State Tax Comm. v. Hopkins, 234 Ala. 556, 176 So. 21o (i937); Kamp v. Johnson, 15 Cal. (2d)
,87, 99 P. (2d) 274 (1940); Commonwealth v. Miller, 337 Pa. 246, xi A. (2d) 141 (1940).
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makes a "sale" under the definition in the taxing act. While some courts say the
relative value of the materials, twenty per cent, to the services rendered is of no
significance, it is nevertheless probably influential. The optometrist makes an actual
transfer of tide to tangible personal property. Such a transfer properly belongs to
the occupation of the optician who is taxable," and not to that of an optometrist.
If the optometrist invades the optician's field of business as a vendor of merchandise,
he cannot then claim immunity from the imposition of a tax merely because he
happens also to be engaged in the profession of optometry.
The pharmacist in preparing prescriptions has, despite his allegations of professional character, been held taxable even in Illinois. 1 2 The basis of the tax is usually
the total selling price of the prescription, rather than the twenty-five to fifty per cent
which represents materials. This is an easier case than that of the optometrist, because
of this larger proportion of property to services, and also because of the public's attitude that it is purchasing prescribed drugs rather than the service of a pharmacist.
Attempts by undertakers' 3 to evade a tax on the sale of caskets and shrouds because
of state regulation of their business have also been unsuccessful, though they are not
taxed on the service rendered.
Many other kinds of tangible personal property derive their chief value from the
labor expended in their manufacture. Yet, this alone is not sufficient to create a tax
exemption. The actual cost of the canvas and pigment may be infinitesimal in
comparison with the value of the work wrought by a Rembrandt's genius. The cost
of the yarn used in a rug may be quite negligible in comparison with the value added
by the artistry of the weaver. Yet the sale of the Rembrandt or the Oriental rug is
taxable, as is the manufacture of products involving a lesser labor element. 14
While theoretically the repair trades may effect a sale of the materials used in
connection with their service, the courts have taken a more practical approach.
Usually they have come to consistent results. The important criteria have been two:
first, the relative importance of the value of the tangible personal property ordinarily
used in conjunction with this type of repair work as compared with the total charge
therefor; and, second, the trade practice customarily followed, before the tax was
levied, in connection with billing in that occupation. This second criterion is much
preferable to one based on the practice of the particular tradesman, or the method
of billing in the particular transaction, since the taxpayer should not be allowed to
evade the tax by manipulating the form but not the substance of the transaction.
The point has been stressed that here the work is on property belonging to another.
The slight amount of new materials added by the repairman becomes a part of the
1"

See Ill. Ret. Occ. Tax Rules and Reg. (x939) Rule 32; N. Y. City Sales Tax Reg. (1939) art. 74.
Wray's Pharmacy v. Lee, 599 So. 767 (Fla. 1941) (the statute included "any services which are a

part of such sale"); Appeal of Biser, 317 Pa. [90, 176 Ad. 200 (1935); Ill. Ret. Occ. Tax Rules and Reg.
(1939) Rule i2; see Dep't of Treasury v. Ridgely, 211 Ind. 9, 4 N. E. (2d) 557 (1936). Cf. Mich. Sales
Tax Reg. (r940) Rule 57, which taxes only 50 per cent of the total charge, if a record of the prescription
is kept.
" Ahem v. Nudelman, 374 Ill. 237, 29 N. E. (2d) 268 (1940); Kistner v. Iowa State Board, 225
Iowa 404, 280 N. W. 587 (938); Commonwealth v. Dennien, 320 Pa. 257, 582 Atl. 542 (1936).
"See Bigsby v. Johnson, 99 P. (2d) 268 (Cal. 1940); Appeal of Biser, supra note 12.
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customers' property not by a process of sale, but rather through the doctrine of
accession.

Textile and fur cleaners, dyers and repairers, watch repairers, and laundries have
all been held not to make "sales."' 5 Auto repairers 16 are not taxable on transfers of
paints, lubricants, or minor supplies; but they must pay the tax on sales of auto acces-

sories and parts, where material costs are high and the trade practice in billing has
consistently been to itemize labor and materials. Shoe repairing has presented a close
question. The largeness of the proportion of materials to service, over thirty per cent,
must be counterbalanced against the accounting difficulty of determining the amount
of leather going into each repair, and the trade practice of lump sum billing. The
prevailing view 17 is that the shoe repairer does make a "sale." An Iowa decision,' 8
originally going to the contrary, was modified on rehearing so that as to taps and
rubber heels, where the service element is small and there is competition with retail
stores subject to tax, the transfer from the shoe repairer to the customer is taxable.
Illinois 1 solves the bookkeeping difficulty by providing that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, tax will be collected on one-third of the total receipts from
shoe-repair work.
The problem of installation charges20 is treated a good deal like that of repair.
Probably the decisive criteria are the same: the proportion of merchandise cost to
services, and the trade practice followed in billing. Illinois,21 however, taxes the
installation cost only if the seller is required to install the property in order to complete the sales contract. This again presents some risk of a manipulation of form to
escape taxation.
Despite conflicting common-law rules 22 as to whether or not serving food and
drink in a restaurant constitutes a sale for the purpose of imposing an implied warranty of fitness, the courts23 have held in the affirmative for the purpose of the taxing

act. This is one instance where common-law decisions are of dubious value in
deciding sales tax cases. Here future doctrinal developments may hold in store the
reverse effect of sales tax decisions influencing the doctrine of implied warranty in
restaurant cases.
"In re H. D. Kampf, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 319 (S. D. N. Y. 194I); Walter Mahon v. Nudelman, Sup.
Ct. of Cook County, Ill., Nov. 8, 1940 (unreported); Marshall v. Ames, 373 Ill. 381, 26 N. E. (2d) 483
(1940); Matter of Mendoza v. Taylor, 272 N. Y. 275, 5 N. E. (2d) 818 (1936).
'5 Doby v. State Tax Comm., 234 Ala. 150, 174 So. 233 (1937).
"See Revsan v. Nudelman, 370 Ill. i8o, i8 N. E. (2d) 219 (1938); H. H. Atkinson Co. v. State,
Circuit Ct. of Wayne County, Mich., April, 1934 (unreported); Western Leather and Finding Co. v.
State Tax Comm., 87 Utah 227, 48 P. (2d) 526 (1935).
"8Sandberg Co. v. Iowa State Board, 225 Iowa 103, 278 N. W. 643 (1938), modified on rehearing,
" I1l. Ret. Occ. Tax Rules and Reg. (i939) Rule 13.
225 Iowa 111, 281 N. W. 197 (1938).
"0Fifteenth Street Inv. Co. v. People, 102 Colo. 571, 8i P. (2dY 764 (1938); American Molasses Co.
v. MeGoldrick, 256 App. Div. 649, iI N. Y. S. (2d) 289 (1939); Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Heat
and Power, 333 Pa. 46, 3 A. (2d) 412 (i939); Commonwealth v. Miller, 337 Pa. 246, xi A. (2d) 141
"lll. Ret. Occ. Tax Rules and Reg. (i939) Rule 64.
(940).
"' McCarley v. Wood Drugs, 228 Ala. 226, 153 So. 446 (1934) (no sale for warranty purposes);

Greenwood v. John I Thompson Co.,

213

Ill. App. 371 (1919) (serving food does constitute a sale);

op. cit. supra note 4, at 485.
"Pappanastos v. State Tax Comm., 235 Ala. 50, 177 So. 158 (937); State Tax Comm. v. Burns,
236 Ala. 307, 182 So. 1 (1938); Breevort Hotel v. Ames, 360 Ill- 485, x96 N. E. 461 (1935).
I WmILLISTON,
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The courts are sharply divided as to the applicability of the sales tax to occupations
such as printing, engraving, photography, etc. A minority of jurisdictions, led by
Illinois in Burgess v.Ames,2 4 make a distinction between work done on special order
without value to any person other than the immediate purchaser, and that done
which has general commercial value. Despite the Illinois court's refusal to give
weight to common-law precedents, this distinction is probably based on the Massachusetts common-law rule 25 that contracts of the former type were for labor and
materials, and not for a sale. This rule was carried over into the Uniform Sales Act
to exclude from the operation of the Statute of Frauds manufactured goods for which
there is no market aside from the individual purchaser. The printer, the courts say,
has no absolute property right capable of transfer either in the copy presented to him,
or in the product when finished. If it is a lawyer's brief, the title remains in the
lawyer. The small amount of paper and ink which has been transferred has had its
commercial value destroyed by the printing process, and now has worth only as a
brief. What the customer really pays for is not the paper and ink, but rather the
skill and labor of the printer, and the use of his machinery and equipment.
That this service element is any the less important when a complicated form is
printed for a limited class of the general public, as compared to a simple letterhead
printed by the millions for a large corporation, is certainly not easy to demonstrate.
Difficulty also occurs as to the taxability of sales of supplies to the printer 20 when
even the printer does not know at the time of the purchase which of the supplies
will be used for a tax-free transfer, since on special order, and which as a taxable
sale, since of general commercial value. Complete exemption of the entire series of
transactions from tax may be the most practical solution. These difficulties need not
spread to custom-built autos or clothing,27 unless the peculiarity of the design
definitely makes them without general commercial value.
Probably the majority of jurisdictions, 2 8 however, hold printing and the allied
arts subject to sales tax. In their judgment, the controlling factor is that the customer,
even if giving a special order, desires not a service, but rather the delivery of a
finished product. This factor distinguishes these cases from the professional work
and repair exemptions, where the primary desire in most instances is the service,
rather than the material. The proportion in value of the materials used to the service
performed is of little importance, especially since it varies with the number of units
"4359 IIl. 427, 194 N. E. 565 (1935) (blueprinting and photostatic copying); see also Adair Printing
v. Ames, 364 Ill.
342, 4 N. E. (2d) 635 (936) (printing); A. B. C. Electrotype v. Ames, 364 IIl. 36o,
4 N. E. (2d) 476 (1936) (electrotyping and stereotyping); Baker v. Tax Comm., Ohio Com. P1.,
Cuyahoga County, April 4, 1940 (unreported) (printing); Washington Printing and Binding Co. v. State,
" i WswsroN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 50.
192 Wash. 448, 73 P. (2d) 1326 (937) (printing).
" See Acme Printing Co. v. Nudelman, 371 Il1. 217, 2o N. E. (2d) 277 (1939) (sale of ink to printer
27
held2 taxable).
See Ill. Ret. Occ. Tax Rules and Reg. (1939) Rule 30.
sLong v. Roberts & Son, 234 Ala. 520, 176 So. 213 (937) (commercial printing; dissent on basis
of the Illinois decisions); Bigsby v. Johnson, supra note x4 (printing); Cusick v. Commonwealth, 260
Ky. 204, 84 S.W. (2d) 14 (935) (commercial photography); People ex rel. Walker Engraving Co. v.
Graves, 268 N. Y. 648, 198 N. E. 539 (1935) (engraving); see Typecrafters, Inc. v, City of Philadelphia,
34 D. & C. 82' (Pa. Com. P1. 1938).
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in the transfer of engraved

plates valued at not more than two per cent of the purchase price3 0
In summary, litigation has revealed some four factors which will be considered by
most courts in determining the taxability of tangible personal property transferred in
conjunction with a service rendered: first, the percentage of value of the property

transferred to the total charge collected; second, the primary desire of the usual
purchaser in entering into the transaction, whether to obtain materials of good quality
or to secure a skillful service individualized to his needs; third, the ease with which
the same article, in like quantity, may be obtained from some taxable source; and
fourth, the established trade practice in billing. Judgments under these criteria are
difficult to make. Except under the first factor, in cases falling within the rule of
de minimis, no one factor will itself be determinative. It is likely, furthermore, that
these criteria do run counter to the tax exemption given by the minority of jurisdictions to the optometrist, and to the printer working on special orders.
Sale by Another Name
Further, there are the situations which, because of the lack of a transfer of legal

tide, are not, strictly speaking, "sales," but which are nevertheless specifically included
in the statutes of certain states.2 A too literal regard for this language is often unwarranted. The courts3 2 have frequently held that the legislators did not mean what

literally they had enacted, but rather inserted the added language to cover an attempted tax evasion by making a "sale" under some other guise.
Transactions whereby the possession of the property is transferred but the seller
retains the title merely as security for payment of the selling price, are always held
to be taxable as "sales. 3 3s "Leases and rentals" of tangible personalty are covered by
some statutes expressly, 4 by others through implication 2 5 and by some not at all.3 6
In any jurisdiction, however, when a contract for rental, lease, or bailment is in fact
a contract to sell such property, as evidenced by the fact that the lessee or bailee
agreed to pay an amount substantially equivalent to the purchase price, or had the
option of becoming the owner by complying with contract terms, the subterfuge will
be struck aside and a tax collectedV 7
"People ex rel.
Walker Engraving Co. v. Graves, supra note 28.
50A compromise solution for this class of cases is suggested by Voss v. Gray, 298 N. W. i (N. D.
194). It was there held that where a photographer makes two charges-one for the sitting, whether or
not the photographs are delivered, and a second if and when they are-the sales tax applies only to the
latter. But where only one charge is made, or the splitting of the charge is not in good faith, the tax is
applicable to the entire price.
" See, e.g., MicH. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, i936) §752(b); New York City Local Laws x939, No. ioI,
§N4i-x-o(5). The wording of these and similar statutes is discussed later.
" Howitt v. Street & Smith Publications, 276 N. Y. 345, 12 N. E. (2d) 435 (1938); Western
Machinery Co. v. Johnson, Cal. Super. Ct., Sept. 28, 1939 (unreported); see CAL. GEN. LAws (Deering,
1938) §8493-2(c).
"aILL. Rav. SrAT. (Bar Ass'n Ed., X939) c. 120, §440.

"CAL. GEN. LAws (Deering, 1938) §84 93-2(b); V. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie and Sublett, 1937)
§999(2) 4; Oino CODE ANN. (Throckmorton, 1940) §5546-1.

"New York City Local Laws 1939, No. ioi, §N4i-i.o(5).
" See 111.Ret. Occ. Tax Rules and Reg. (939)

Rule 16.

7ibid.
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Of great interest is a series of cases in New York and Pennsylvania limiting the
extent of their statutory definition of "sale," which includes "any transfer of title or
possession or both,... license to use or consume or otherwise, in any manner or by
any means whatsoever."38 In the leading case of Howitt v, Street & Smith Publica.
tions,39 a publisher paid an artist a consideration for the right to reproduce sixteen
of the artist's paintings on the covers of the publisher's magazines. Possession of the
paintings was temporarily given to the publisher, who sent them to a photo-engraver.
The court, saying that the definition was only an "attempt to cover a situation where
parties might attempt to call a sale by another name," held that this right to reproduce
was not a "sale." The court stressed the fact that the photo-engraver could as well
have made the reproduction while the drawing was still in the artist's possession in
his studio, and that the transfer of possession was therefore merely incidental. In
an earlier case40 a designer created several paper sketches which were then traced
on copper rolls, and through these fabric was run for the purpose of imprinting the
design on the cloth. Unlike the paintings in the Howitt case, the sketches became
the property of the manufacturer; the transaction was accordingly held taxable as a
"transfer of tide and possession" rather than as a "license to use."
In Dun & Bradstreetv. City of New York,4 1 the delivery by a credit agency to its
subscribers of possession to reference books, worth possibly seventy-five per cent of
the total charge, was, on motion to dismiss, held not taxable as a "license to use."
The reference books were considered to be merely incidental to the rendering of a
service; nor was the possession of the customer complete inasmuch as he was expected
to keep the information private and return the books at the termination of the contract, or whenever a new edition was published. To achieve a dubious consistency
with the Howitt case, the Appellate Division, in its later decision, 42 pointed out that
the possession of the books need not have been transferred at all, since the subscriber
could secure any of the information contained in them by a visit to the office of the
credit-rating agencies. More recently,4" the sale of books and pamphlets containing
financial information, published periodically and furnished as an information service,
was held subject to tax. While absence of an opinion makes judgment hazardous,
the case may be distinguished from the Dun & Bradstreet decision since unrestricted
title to these books and pamphlets probably was transferred to the subscriber.
A commercial photographer44 by express reservation retained tide to prints and
graphic illustrations, but transferred the possession thereof to his customers for
advertising purposes. That the substantial fee charged by the photographer was paid
for the right to reproduce, rather than for the particular print or illustration, is shown
" N. Y. City Local Laws 1939, No. roi, §N4i-x.o(5) (ital. added); Philadelphia City Laws x938,
Sales Tax Ord., §Id.
so 276 N. Y. 345, x2 N. E. (2d) 435 (x938)" People ex rel. Foremost Studios v. Graves, 264 App. Div. 130, 284 N. Y. Supp. 9o6 (1936).
41276 N. Y. x98, ii N. E. (2d)' 728 (1937) (decided on the complaint).
42 168 Misc. 215, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 597 (1938) (decided on the facts proved at trial).
"Moody Investors Service v. McGoldrick, 280 N. Y. 58r, 2o N. E. (2d) 35 (1938)
the basis of the Dun & Bradstreet decision).
"' Andersen v. City of New York, 172 Misc. 370, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 555 (1939).

(two dissents on
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by the fact that if the print was lost, or the customer wanted another, he could secure
the same for a nominal fee. On the basis of the Howitt case, this right to reproduce
45
was held not to be a "license to use or consume," and therefore not taxable.

In view of these New York cases restricting the "license to use" clause, the case
of United Artists Corp. v. Taylor," decided before the Howitt case and holding
taxable a license to exhibit motion picture films, may be questionable. The case can,
of course, be distinguished, since the license to exhibit, without the transfer of pos42
session, which was for a definite period, would be valueless. A Louisiana decision,
with comparable statutory language to construe, felt that the United Artists case was
still good law, despite later New York cases, and therefore reached the same result.
Under the similar Philadelphia ordinance,48 the opinions seem to adopt the
broader interpretation of "license to use." A linen supply house has been held taxable,49 because the right to possession was necessary to the use and was transferred
for a sufficient length of time to come within the Howitt case, even though title to
the linen remained in the supply house. As to typesetters, a distinction is made,
based on the person purchasing the type-metal.5 0 If the printer purchases the metal,
then the typesetter renders only services. If, however, the type-metal is furnished by
the typesetter, and loaned on a deposit charge to the printer, though no charge is
ultimately made for anything but the service in either case, then the entire transaction
is deemed taxable because of the transfer of the "license to use." Even if one is to
adopt the broader construction of these cases, its application may be questioned in
this type of situation where no charge whatsoever is made for the so-called "license
to use."

Sale for Other than Money or Profit
The courts have been almost uniform in holding that the profit motive is not
essential to the creation of a taxable "sale." 51 A California decision,52 however, has
held that a social club incidentally furnishing meals to its members was not in the
"business" of selling. The intervening passage of an amendment, specifically taxing
club transactions, influenced this conclusion. The Pennsylvania view5 3 holding clubs
subject to the tax is preferable. A gas company selling gas appliances at cost in order
" Burgess v. Ames, 359 Ill.
427, 194 N. E. 565 (1935), more easily reached the same result with a
statute not containing the "right; to use" clause.
"-73
N. Y. 334, 7 N. E. (2d) 254 (1937).
"Saenger Realty Corp. v. Grosjean, 194 La. 470, 193 So. 71o (1940).
"Cited supra note 38.
"Philadelphia Ass'n of Linen Suppliers v. City of Philadelphia, 139 Pa. Super. 560, 12 A. (2d) 789
(940).
Contra: Ohio Sales Tax Reg. (1939) Rule 122.
" Typecrafters, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, strpra note 28. Contra: Ill. Ret. Occ. Tax Rules and Reg.
(1939) Rule 36.
"Stone v. Rogers, x86 Miss. 53, 189 So. 81o (r939); Bay City v. State Board, 292 Mich. 241, 290
N. V. 395 (1940).
" Union League Club v. Johnson, xo8 P. (2d) 487 (Cal. 1940).
"Wilson v. City of Philadelphia, 330 Pa. 342, x98 Ad. 889 (1938).
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to stimulate gas consumption has been held taxable."4 And a retailer taking merchandise from stock for his own use,5 5 has also been held accountable for the sales tax,
since otherwise, it is argued, he has an unfair advantage over his neighbors. If the
retailer were not taxable, then the wholesaler, as to this merchandise, would be
making a sale at retail; but any attempt to trace this sale back to the wholesaler
would be administratively ineffective. It has also been held"0 that there is no tax on
a foreclosure sale to the mortgagee under a chattel mortgage, since the sale does not
transfer title, but merely extinguishes the mortgagor's equity of redemption.
Nor need a sale be for money in order to fall within the sales tax act; it need
only be "for a valtable consideration." Such a consideration includes in addition to
money the value of any merchandise given or service rendered in exchange for
property. Barter transactions, therefore, are taxable, at least to the party engaged in
business, if not to both.5 7 Trade-ins are generally taxed on the basis of the allowed
rather than the actual value.58 A trifle inconsistently, food served to restaurant employees as part payment for their services is not taxable.5 9 This is probably in accord
with the common conception of what constitutes a sale, and administratively is a
practical result; yet a logical argument could be made that the services rendered by
the employees were a "valuable consideration" for which the food was transferred.
THE NATuRE

oF TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY

The sales tax applies to the sale of "tangible personal property." Because most
statutes do not contain a workable definition, the distinctions between tangible and
intangible property, personalty and realty, are usually the same as those of the
common law. Tangibles consist of things or substances which may be touched, felt,
or observed; things that are "perceptible, palpable, capable of being possessed or
realized." 60 Intangibles, which are not taxable, include shares of stock, bonds, corporate or other franchises, evidences of interest in property, evidences of indebtedness,
and the like. Services, already discussed, might well be considered intangible, as well
as rights to use, to consume, to reproduce, etc. Some few additional problems deserve
special attention.
While it requires little argument to establish that electricity, gas, steam, and water
are tangible within any definition of that term, much can be said for the contention
that a statute referring to sales of tangible personal property is not intended to include them. It has also been questioned"' whether the compulsory furnishing of
' Lee v. Jacksonville Gas Co., 138 Fla. 890, z9o So. 8oo (1939).
"Mann v. McCaroll, 198 Ark. 628, 130 S. IV. (2d) 721 (i939).
" Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. McGoldrick, 256 App. Div. 205, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 515 (1939).
" Stone v. Rogers, supra note 51.
"Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Fry, 277 Mich. 26o, 269 N. NV. x66 (1936); Missouri v. Hallenberg-Wagner Motor Co., 341 Mo. 771, io8 S. W. (2d) 398 (i937); c. II. Ret. Occ. Tax Rules and Reg.
(939) Rule x5, which taxes trade-ins only on the basis of cash actually received on later sale of property
traded in. See generally, Ratchford, The Measure of Constumptiot; Taxes, infra this issue.
GoIn re Messinger's Merchants Lunch Room, 85 F. (2d) xoo2 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936); State Tax Comm.
v. Burns, 236 Ala. 307, x82 So. 1 (1938).
1
"I1.

Ret. Occ. Tax Rules and Reg. (1939) art. 15.

' Jacoby, supra note i.
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such commodities at government-controlled rates to customers who have no option

but to buy can properly be called a "sale" at all, as that term is commonly used. In
62
the absence of a usual statutory provision, the courts are divided as to taxability.
An interesting case arose as to the sale of steam from a central heating plant.63 If the
steam is delivered to the consumer, who subsequently uses the water condensed

therefrom, it was said to be taxable. But if such a transaction take the form of a
delivery of heat units through a radiating system, with the steam or condensed water
returning to the vendor or allowed to run down a sewer, the opposite conclusion was
held to follow, probably because of the intangible nature of heat units.
Newspapers, characteristically, have felt that they should be in a specially favored
class, and were, therefore, disturbed when Bigsby v. Johnson" held them subject
to the sales tax. Their contention is that as they do not really sell anything tangible,
but rather sell their services and convey intangible information which possesses only
temporary value, they should not, therefore, be taxed. But certainly there is a transfer
of tangible paper, and it has general commercial value at least for the day.
As sales taxes apply only to personal property, the sale of land, and of buildings
and other permanent improvements to land, are consequently all free from taxation.
But what of a case 65 where A, the owner of a farm, leases a gravel pit on his farm
to B, who is building a road? Under the agreement the rental is fixed at fifteen cents
per yard of gravel removed. Gravel, while in its original bed, is as much a part
of the realty as the earth itself. But once separated from the land it becomes tangible
personalty. When placed in the roadbed, it again reassumes its character as real
property. The determination of taxability may depend on an interpretation of the
terms of the agreement. If the owner is selling all of the gravel in a specified tract
of land, the sale is a sale of real property, even though payment may depend on the
amount of gravel removed. On the other hand, if the owner is merely agreeing to
sell such gravel as may be taken from the land, or a certain number of yards of
gravel at a specified price per yard, the sale is a sale of gravel when and as it is
separated from the land. In the first case no tax is collectible, while in the second
there is a tax, unless this be an isolated or casual sale.
In Swain Nelson & Sons Co. v.Dep't of Finance66 a nurseryman unsuccessfully
attempted to evade the Illinois retailers' occupation tax. He argued that trees and
shrubbery are real property at the time a contract is made, and since they must be
growing in the purchasers' soil before the terms of the contract are fulfilled, no
"' People's Gas Light and Coke Co. v. Ames, 359 Ill.112, 194 N. E. 260 (1934) , held that the

legislative intent was against such taxation, though later in People v. Menagas, 367 Ill. 330, ii N. E.
(2d) 403 (1937), it was held that electricity was tangible property and therefore subject to larceny.
Wiseman v. Arkansas Utilities Co., x91 Ark. 854, 88 S. W. (2d) 81 (1935), declared that since the sale
of natural gas was made expressly subject to the tax, sales of artificial gas were impliedly exempt,
notwithstanding that the act provided that the tax applied to al sales of tangible personal property.
Bay City v. State Board, supra note 51, held public utilities taxable.
"aDetroit Edison Co. v. Fry, Circ. Ct. Wayne County, Mich., March, 1934 (unreported).
0' Supra note 14.
"' Op. A'rY. GEN. ILL. (1933) 773.

66365 Il. 401, 6 N. E. (2d) 632 (1937).
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transfer of personal property takes place. The court, refusing to give any weight

to common-law and Uniform Sales Act decisions, held that since the trees and shrubs
are personal property when severed for transportation, tide passes at that time, and
there is, therefore, a sale of personal property within the taxing act.
This distinction between personalty and realty receives its most frequent application in the case of contractors. The trend today is definitely towards holding such
contractors outside the scope of the sales tax.67 The arguments made are two: First,
that this is not a sales contract at all but a contract for work and materials. This is
a questionable argument in view of the large material cost, and the customer's attitude that he is paying for a finished job rather than the contractor's services. Second,
that the contract is not to deliver materials and fixtures as such, but rather to deliver
the finished building or other structure which is realty and not personalty. By the
doctrine of accession, the materials furnished, when attached to the realty, become
part of the realty, and thereby lose their identity as personal property. It should not
make any difference that the contract is on a time and material basis, rather than
for a lump sum. The amount charged includes labor and material costs plus profits,
and is the same in either case. A distinction is drawn in Illinois s between "materials,"
such as gravel and steel beams, which lose their identity in the completed structure
and therefore are not taxable, and "fixtures," such as bath tubs and radiators, which
do not lose their identity when installed, and therefore are taxable. This differentiation has caused endless difficulty in application and has little logical basis. The recent
Illinois decision in Materials Service Corp. v. Nudelman,69 now on appeal, will, if
affirmed, resolve this difficulty by giving the transfer from the contractor complete
70
exemption from the sales tax.
An argument that an undertaker 7 l was not selling tangible personal property, but
rather was using the caskets and converting the same into real property by burial in
the ground, was answered by holding that title to the caskets passed as of the date
of signing the contract rather than at burial, thus making the sale one of personalty.
A similar argument as to gravestones 72 was also overthrown.
67Lone

Star Cement Co. v. State Tax Comm., 234 Ala. 465, 75 So. 699 (x937); Materials Service

Corp. v. Nudelman, Circ. Ct. Cook County, Ill.,
Feb. 14, 1941 (appeal being taken); Herlihy Mid-Contincnt
Co. v. Nudelman, 367 Ill. 6oo, 12 N. E. (2d) 638 (1938); State v. Christhilf, z70 Md. 586, 185 Ad.
456 (1936); Acorn Iron Works v. State Board, 295 Mich. 143, 295 N. W. 126 (1940); Albuquerque
Lumber v. Bureau of Revenue, 45 N. M. 58, 75 P. (2d) 334 (1940).
Contra: Bradley Supply Co. v. Ames, 359 Ill. 162, 194 N. E. 272 (935) (distinguished in the Herlihy

case, and repudiated in the Materials Service case); Blome Co. v. Ames, 365 Ill. 457, 6 N. E. (2d) 84!
(1937) (overruled by the Herlihy case); Moore v. Pleasant Harbor Const. Co., 50 Ariz. 317, 7z P. (2d)
573 (1937) (based on the Bradley and Blome cases); Wiseman v. Gillioz, 192 Ark. 950, 96 S. W, (2d)
459 (1936).
" See Ill. Ret. Occ. Tax Rules and Reg. (939) Rule 6, based on Bradley Supply Co. v. Ames, supra
note 67.
" Supra note 67.
7'If the contractor be held not liable, is he therefore to be considered the ultimate consumer so that
the sale from the material man to him is taxable as a sale at retail of tangible personal property? This
and analogous problems are considered by ahrhaftig, supra note 3.
71 Kistner v. Iowa State Board, supra note X3.
7'Goldstein Monument Works, Inc. v. Graves, 254 App. Div. 798, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 241 (1938).
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In conclusion a few generalizations may be made. While the wording of each
statute must be carefully noted, there is a tendency for the courts to base decisions
on their conception of the general nature of a sales transaction, and, therefore, to use
similar reasoning even in different jurisdictions under different taxing acts. Commonlaw and Uniform Sales Act decisions, despite the frequent statements of the courts
to the contrary, are often of value. The tendency is for the court to watch for the
administrative practicability of differing solutions, whenever it does not feel too
strongly one way or another. The need for revenue, in a tax originally passed as an
emergency fund-raising measure, is probably considered. In addition to the inconsistencies in the same situations apparent as between jurisdictions, there is frequently
little consistency within each jurisdiction in the treatment of differing fact situations.
However, the sales tax is a new taxing device. It can well be expected that, as the
court decisions become more numerous, they will also become more uniform in their
definition of the taxable transaction.

